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PONZI SCHEMES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Honorable Dorothy T. Eisenberg

 
Nicholas W. Quesenberry

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ponzi schemes are not new, and they have been present within 
the financial community for many years, even before the case of 
Charles Ponzi, which gave us the name “Ponzi Scheme.”  However, 
the frequency and magnitude of these schemes that have been re-
vealed in the last few years is staggering. 
Since the onset of the global economic meltdown in 2008, 
many such schemes have had a light shown on them, which revealed 
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the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York on March 28, 1989.  Prior 
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that firm.  She received her LLB degree from Brooklyn Law School in 1950 at the age of 20, 
requiring her to wait several months to take the Bar Exam.  She has been admitted to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.   
 Prior to becoming a Bankruptcy Judge, she was a member of the Committee on Character 
& Fitness, Appellate Division, Second Department from 1983 until taking the bench.  She 
had been a Panel Trustee for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern and South-
ern Districts of New York.  She is a fellow of the American Bar Foundation, a member of 
the American Bar Association, National Association of Women Judges, Women’s Bar Asso-
ciation of the State of New York, American Bankruptcy Institute, New York State Bar Asso-
ciation, Member, Advisory Committee of Federal Bar Council at Central Islip, New York, 
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Roosevelt American Inn of Court, and a member of the Bar Association of Nassau County, 
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ministration of the United States in regard to case administration and electronic case filing 
for Bankruptcy Courts.  Currently, she is a member of the Advisory Committee for the New 
York State and Federal Judicial Council. 
 Nicholas W. Quesenberry, Esq., graduated magna cum laude from Penn State Law in May 
of 2011.  In June of 2012, he obtained his Master of Laws in Bankruptcy degree from St. 
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Eastern District of New York, currently reporting to Chief Judge Carla E. Craig. 
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these problems in areas which were unexpected and surprising to all 
of us, including the rise and fall of the Bernard Madoff enterprise.1  
These schemes have been perpetrated by people who appeared to be 
knowledgeable, even recognized professionals such as law firms and 
substantial business men or women. 
In reviewing what happens when Ponzi schemes inevitably 
fail, many enterprises wind up in bankruptcy, or some similar form of 
orderly liquidation (such as a receivership, or a criminal restitution 
proceeding conducted by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices).  Ponzi 
schemes cannot generally be reorganized, because they usually have 
no actual business to rehabilitate, only some assets that can be liqui-
dated and distributed amongst various competing claimants.  This 
state of affairs makes the sort of orderly liquidation that is available 
in bankruptcy an ideal mechanism to put the financial affairs of the 
Ponzi scheme to rest. 
We hope to illustrate this point by contrasting what takes 
place in bankruptcy liquidation with what would happen if each 
Ponzi victim/investor were essentially left to his or her own devices.  
In the former case, there is a structured mechanism designed to pro-
duce both the equitable distribution of assets and the maximum re-
covery for each claimant.  In the latter case, the resulting cannibaliza-
tion of the Ponzi scheme’s assets would see some victims obtaining 
large sums, and others (situated in the same equitable position) get-
ting little or nothing. 
In the usual case where a Ponzi scheme is liquidated in bank-
ruptcy, a “trustee” will be appointed to take ownership and control of 
the enterprise’s assets, in the name of a bankruptcy estate created for 
the benefit of creditors.  The trustee’s job is to seek out and recover 
any assets which were held in the name of the debtor, or in which the 
debtor had any interest.  Once all the assets are marshaled together, 
the trustee’s job is to distribute them to the legitimate claimants, in 
accordance with the priority scheme put in place by the U.S. Bank-
 
1 Recent bankruptcy cases involving Ponzi schemes include: In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. 
Secs., Case No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Petters Co., et al., Case No. 08-
45257 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2008); In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., Case No. 09–34791 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009); In re Capitol Invs., Inc., Case No. 09–36408 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2009); In re Bayou Grp., LLC, et al., Case No. 06–22306 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Jani-
torial Close-Out City Corp., Case No. 09–72982 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Agape 
World, Inc., Case No. 09-70660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Dreier, LLP, Case No. 09–
15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Laing, et al., Case No. 04–bk–03621 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2004); In re Am. Pac. Fin. Corp., Case No. 10-72855 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). 
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ruptcy Code. 
The trustee’s role is often a thankless one, as it usually puts 
him or her in an adversarial posture to the very claimants for whose 
benefit s/he has been charged to act.  The earlier investors in a Ponzi 
scheme tend to realize a significant return, while those who invest in 
the scheme at a later point in time tend to be left with little payment.  
Since one of the aims of the Bankruptcy Code is equitable distribu-
tion amongst similarly-situated creditors, the trustee will usually 
commence litigation against the investors who realized the greatest 
returns from the scheme.  The aim here is to “claw back” those ex-
cess payments, so that they may be distributed ratably. 
We note that the bankruptcy process is rife with pitfalls, both 
for the trustee on the one hand, and for the claimants whose payments 
s/he seeks to recapture on the other.  The trustee has a formidable ar-
senal of “avoidance actions” that s/he can commence against Ponzi 
investors who received more than their equitable share from the 
scheme.  Due in part to the inherently-fraudulent nature of a Ponzi 
scheme, the Trustee is aided by certain evidentiary presumptions that 
ease his/her burden of proof in claw-back litigation.  On the other 
hand, claimants also have multiple defenses that they can invoke in 
order to keep at least some portion of their returns. 
II. CHARLES PONZI 
The criminal enterprise of Charles Ponzi provides a good il-
lustration of both the general characteristics of Ponzi schemes and the 
reasons why they inevitably fail.  Mr. Ponzi convinced people to lend 
money to him by falsely claiming that he was in the business of pur-
chasing international postal coupons and selling them at 100% profit 
(when, in fact, he had no such business).2  Mr. Ponzi promised his in-
vestors a return of $150 for every $100 contributed, payable within 
90 days.3  Mr. Ponzi fulfilled his fantastic promises for a while, be-
cause of the seemingly everlasting influx of new investors.4  He took 
these new investors’ money and, with it, turned around and paid the 
covenanted returns to earlier investors, while of course keeping a 
healthy percentage for himself.5 
 
2 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7 (1924). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 8. 
5 Id. at 7-8. 
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In June of 1920, Mr. Ponzi was raking in $1 million per 
week6—the equivalent of over $12.33 million per week in 2014 dol-
lars7—from new contributions.  However, public authorities soon be-
gan investigating Mr. Ponzi, whereupon he stopped soliciting invest-
ments.8  Once this was reported to the public, Mr. Ponzi’s investors 
began demanding their principal back en masse, creating a “run” on 
his operation.9 
Mr. Ponzi had enough money put aside to satisfy his inves-
tors’ claims for a while, but not for long, because his operation had 
become ever-more insolvent the longer it continued.10  He had prom-
ised his investors a 50% profit.11  Moreover, Mr. Ponzi paid the 
“salesmen,” who helped him lure his victims, a 10% commission.12  
Accordingly, for every dollar Mr. Ponzi brought in, he incurred $1.60 
in liabilities—without any real economic output from legitimate 
business activity to make up the difference.  Thus, when the scheme 
ground to a halt and Mr. Ponzi’s victims began demanding payment, 
he could not possibly satisfy all claims.  The money eventually ran 
out, with many claims unpaid.13  This left Mr. Ponzi with little choice 
but to seek the protection of bankruptcy, which he did.14 
III. WHAT IS A PONZI SCHEME? 
Ponzi schemes have no exact definition, since they manifest a 
kaleidoscopic variety of configurations.  Thus, “courts look for a 
general pattern, rather than specific requirements.”15 
 
6 Id. at 8. 
7 Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation. 
htm (last visited May 2, 2014). 
8 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 7-8. 
12 Id. at 8. 
13 Cunningham, U.S. 265 at 9. 
14 Id. 
15 See Manhattan Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 
12 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating there is no precise ponzi scheme definition).  Black’s Law Dic-
tionary defines a Ponzi scheme as follows: 
A fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later in-
vestors generates artificially high dividends or returns for the original in-
vestors, whose example attracts even larger investments.  Money from 
the new investors is used directly to repay or pay interest to earlier inves-
tors, [usually] without any operation or revenue-producing activity other 
4
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A Ponzi scheme is born of deceit.16  Generally, the operator 
ensnares investors by falsely claiming to have found an unusually lu-
crative investment opportunity.  Once the operator accumulates 
enough contributions, he uses those funds to pay handsome “profits” 
to his earliest investors.  This appears to lend credence to his claims 
and, in turn, beguiles more investors into contributing.  Even so, any 
Ponzi profits are necessarily fictitious; without any substantial, real 
business activity, the scheme is incapable of generating true value in 
excess of contributions.
 17 
Indeed, as Mr. Ponzi’s scheme illustrated, the ultimate down-
fall of any Ponzi scheme is that it is insolvent ab initio, and becomes 
ever-more so as it persists.
 18  Each investor is, of course, promised a 
percentage return.  Additionally, many schemes employ “salesmen” 
to lure potential victims; these agents are promised a percentage 
commission on the funds they bring in.  Accordingly, for every dollar 
the scheme takes in, it incurs much more than a dollar of correspond-
ing indebtedness.  This forces the operator perpetually to obtain new 
contributions in order to pay promised investor returns, which per-
petually increases the scheme’s ratio of liabilities to assets.  This cy-
cle continues until the operator can no longer obtain enough “new 
money” to sustain the promised dividends, at which point the scheme 
collapses.19 
The following excerpt from the Journal of Financial Planning 
 
than the continual [deposit] of new funds. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (9th ed. 2009). 
16 This undercuts the contention that the Social Security system is a Ponzi scheme.  It is 
true that the Social Security system uses funds acquired from later “investors” in order to 
pay earlier “investors,” but the Social Security Administration and the United States Treas-
ury do not deceive anyone with an eye towards inducing them to pay into the system.  Ac-
cordingly, it is a misnomer to refer to the Social Security system as a “Ponzi scheme.”  
Compare Surendranath R. Jory & Mark J. Perry, Ponzi Schemes: A Critical Analysis, J. FIN. 
PLAN. (July 24, 2011), http://www.onefpa.org/journal/Pages/Ponzi%20Schemes%20A%20C 
ritical%20Analysis.aspx (calling various Ponzi-like government means of fundraising with-
out deception “rational Ponzi scheme[s]”). 
17 See, e.g., Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 7-8.  See also Manhattan, 397 B.R. at 12; Jory & 
Perry, supra note 16. 
18 See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent Transfers, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 157, 170-73 (1998) (noting that this is the “only reasonable inference” where 
the scheme has “little or no legitimate business operations” aside from operating the Ponzi 
scheme itself); Jory & Perry, supra note 16. 
19 See Jory & Perry, supra note 16.  The foregoing discussion of Charles Ponzi’s scheme 
also provides a good example of this phenomenon.  As discussed, he incurred at least $1.60 
of debt and expense for every $1.00 his scheme brought in. 
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is informative: 
A Ponzi scheme is structured as a pyramid 
wherein more money is needed in each round to make 
payments to existing participants.  For example, a 
Ponzi perpetrator approaches an investor for a one-
year investment that pays a return of 20 percent. The 
investor invests $100,000, expecting $120,000 in a 
year.  At the end of the year the Ponzi perpetrator ap-
proaches another investor, promising the same results, 
but demanding an initial investment of $120,000 this 
time.  Assuming that the second investor accepts the 
proposal, the perpetrator takes the money and pays off 
the first investor.  The cycle continues the third year 
(funds needed are now $144,000), the fourth year 
(funds needed are now $172,800), and so on.  The ini-
tial reward for running a Ponzi scheme is huge.  In the 
example above, the Ponzi perpetrator pockets the ini-
tial $100,000. 
Ponzi schemes are doomed because their fund-
ing requirements increase geometrically over time (as 
the above example illustrates) . . . .  [T]he scheme re-
lies on an infinite supply of capital.  However, this is 
obviously not possible, and that is one reason Ponzi 
schemes eventually fail.20 
IV. WHAT MOTIVATES REASONABLY INTELLIGENT PEOPLE TO 
INVEST IN PONZI SCHEMES? 
A man is incapable of comprehending any argument that in-
terferes with his revenue. – Renee Descartes 
 
Ponzi victims run the gamut, from ordinary citizens to sophis-
ticated, intelligent financial professionals.  One criticism they com-
monly face is that they “should have known better.”21  The returns 
were so high, and they came so fast, that the victims should have 
 
20 Id. 
21 Saul Levmore, Rethinking Ponzi-Scheme Remedies In And Out of Bankruptcy, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 969, 982 (2012). 
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known the scheme was “too good to be true.”22  The Fourth Circuit 
was quite blunt in one case, referring to a certain group of Ponzi vic-
tims “as stupid victims of a transparent fraud.”23 
However, human beings are complex creatures, so there are 
complex motivations for what people do.  Accordingly, we think it 
appropriate briefly to survey some of the most common reasons why 
people choose to invest in Ponzi schemes. 
Since before the time of Charles Ponzi, the primary induce-
ment for people to invest in Ponzi schemes has surely been that the 
“operator promises high financial returns . . . that are not available 
through traditional investments.”24  The operator typically represents 
that such returns are possible “because of [his] unique skills and in-
vestment strategy.”25  For instance, Bernard Madoff attributed his 
consistently high “profits” to his proprietary “split strike conversion” 
trading strategy.26  The strategy seems to have been a smokescreen, 
designed to hide what was little more than the crafty shifting of funds 
from one investor to another.27 
Nevertheless, the question remains: Why do people believe 
the operator’s lies? 
First, many people believe the operator, because he initially 
delivers on his promises by using later contributions to pay very large 
returns to the initial investors.28  Others perceive this, and therefore 
find it plausible that the Ponzi operator can (and will) produce similar 
results for them.29  This, in turn, seduces them to invest.30 
In this regard, perhaps it is helpful to note the observations of 
one who actually invested in a series of Ponzi schemes executed in 
 
22 Id. at 979. 
23 In re Young v. Eby, 294 F. 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1923). 
24 Jory & Perry, supra note 16 (quoting FBI, Common Fraud Schemes, 
http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/fraudschemes.htm (last visited May 2, 2014)). 
25 Id. 
26 Denis Colins, Case Study: Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme: Reliable Returns from a 
Trustworthy Financial Adviser, in Business Ethics: How to Design and Manage Ethical Or-
ganizations, 435, 438 (John Wiley & Sons, 2006), available at http://dcollins.faculty.edgewo 
od.edu/pdfdocuments/Madoff%20Case.pdf. 
27 Id. at 439. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 440. 
30 See R. Alexander Pilmer & Mark T. Cramer, Swindler’s List, 32-JUN L.A. Law. 22, 23 
(June 2009) (“The initial investors usually receive the promised returns, which attracts addi-
tional investors”); see also Jory & Perry, supra note 16 (noting the success often experienced 
by initial investors). 
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the country of Jamaica.  He writes, “[t]he fact that people I knew 
were investing in the [Ponzi] schemes and were, to my certain 
knowledge, making good money from them, carried a lot of weight 
with me.”31 
Furthermore, this investor claims to have been promised re-
turns of around 10% per month—a ludicrously high rate.  Realizing 
that some would argue he “should have known better,” he responds 
as follows: 
How the heck should I know 10% a month is 
unreasonable?  I’m not a banker . . . [a]nd I’m not 
Warren Buffett either.  I have a vague notion that my 
savings account pays a yearly interest rate somewhere 
in the single digits.  If you offer me 10% a month I’m 
gonna take it, and I would’ve taken 25% a month too.  
I only took what the regular financial institutions of-
fered because I figured I couldn’t do any better.32 
Second, once people see their peers “making good money” 
from the schemes, an irrational optimism about the scheme often sets 
in.  This phenomenon causes otherwise rational people to disregard 
even sensible and persuasive arguments against the scheme.  Profes-
sor Richard Taffler addresses this conflict—between irrational opti-
mism about the scheme on the one hand, and rational evaluation of it 
on the other—as follows: 
[The emerging field of] [e]motional finance teaches 
that we often deal with this conflict by avoiding what 
we don’t want to know – we repress these feelings – 
they become unconscious . . . .  There’s a conflict be-
tween the outcomes and returns we wish for and cold, 
hard, reality . . . .33 
Furthermore, as Anne Kates Smith notes, 
 
31 Skulduggery, Investing in Ponzi Schemes (or “Why Investing in a Ponzi Scheme Made 
Perfect Sense at the Time”), THINGS JAMAICANS LOVE (Feb. 16, 2010, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.thingsjamaicanslove.com/the_full_list/investing_in_ponzi_schemes_or_why_inv
esting_in_a_ponzi_scheme_made_perfect_sense_at_the_time.html. 
32 Id. 
33 Penelope Jenkins, Why Investors Fall for Ponzi Schemes, U. WARWICK (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/knowledge/business/ponzischemes/ (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (summarizing and quoting the inaugural lecture of Professor Richard Taffler, pro-
fessor of business and finance at the University of Warwick.  A recording of the lecture is 
available on the website at the foregoing URL). 
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[m]ost of us have a general bias toward optimism.  
“Nobody thinks anything bad is going to happen.  
Otherwise, you’d never leave home in a world full of 
crime, germs and teenage drivers,” says [Pat] Huddle-
ston [SEC trial counsel and fraud expert].  A congru-
ence bias prevents us from seeking evidence that con-
flicts with our [favorable] impressions [of the Ponzi 
scheme], and leads us to discount such evidence if it’s 
presented.  So even if you set out to investigate an in-
vestment proposition, your unconscious goal may be 
to prove it legitimate.34 
Let us again draw insight from our Jamaican Ponzi investor, 
who experienced this baffling mentality: 
The warnings were getting louder.  The regulators 
were naming names and placing full-page ads about 
the schemes in the newspapers. . . .  Traditional finan-
cial institutions were screaming bloody murder.  I, on 
the other hand, chalked it all up to [among other 
things] a “conspiracy to hold down poor people.”  I 
was baffled by all the negativity and pessimism di-
rected at the schemes. . . .  Some people were seeing 
clouds gathering on the horizon and were getting 
nervous.  Not me.  No sir, I was giving it another six 
months.  I figured that in six months I would have 
earned enough to pay off my credit card bills and buy 
that Honda. . . .  As it turns out, I overestimated the 
longevity of the scheme by about . . . six months.35 
Here, we see the profound truth of the Descartes quote above: 
Having seen others making “good money” from Ponzi schemes, peo-
ple become “incapable of comprehending any argument that inter-
feres with” their optimism about the schemes’ positive impact on 
their “revenue.”36 
Third, Ponzi investors are often beguiled by the personality 
and reputation of the con man.  Once people believe in the con man 
 
34 Anne Kates Smith, The Lure of Ponzi Schemes, KIPLINGER’S PERS. FIN. (Mar. 2013), 
available at http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T031-C023-S002-lure-of-ponzi-
schemes.html. 
35 See Skulduggery, supra note 31. 
36 Colins, supra note 26, at 435. 
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personally, they tend, in turn, to believe in his scheme.37  Bernard 
Madoff is a prime example. 
[P]eople were drawn in by [his] personality.  He was 
quiet yet charismatic and did not boast about his fi-
nancial success.  [Madoff] exhibited a strong sense of 
family, loyalty, and honesty, and did not drink alcohol.  
Elderly clients treated [Madoff] as a son, peers treated 
him like a brother, and younger clients treated him like 
a friendly uncle.38 
Mr. Madoff’s reputation made it all the easier for his investors 
to believe in him.  Indeed, 
[i]nvestors are drawn to successful fund managers 
trusted by others.  [Madoff] had a long track record of 
successful investing, and was at the forefront of the 
computerization of stock trading.  He served on SEC 
advisory committees, held a four-year elected term on 
the NASD Adviser Council, and was elected as non-
executive chairman of NASDAQ.39 
Additionally, many “Ponzi [operators] are known to be gen-
erous donors and regularly contribute to charities, educational institu-
tions, and political campaigns.”40  This fosters a “good guy” image, 
which in turn leads people to trust the operator.41  Relatedly, 
[m]any Ponzi operators target specific religious or 
ethnic groups. . . .  They exploit the built-in trust of 
these . . . affinity groups to establish their credibility, 
to identify potential investors, and to promote their 
schemes. . . .  Ponzi himself targeted his fellow Italian 
immigrants.  More recently, Madoff preyed on mem-
bers of the Jewish community, including numerous 
 
37 Cf. Jory & Perry, supra note 16 (“To be able to sell a false idea of consistently high re-
turns, it is likely that Ponzi perpetrators are charismatic salespeople,  persuasive and good at 
successfully closing a sales pitch,” and that “they exploit the trust between them and the 
people they know.”). 
38 Colins, supra note 26, at 440. 
39 Id. (enhancing Mr. Madoff’s credibility was the fact that he “owned a successful and 
legitimate brokerage firm” apart from the Ponzi scheme, which he used to “shield his fraudu-
lent activities.”). 
40 Jory & Perry, supra note 16. 
41 Id. 
10
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Jewish charities.42 
Fourth, one of the hallmarks of a typical Ponzi scheme is that 
investors are lured in by the promise of returns that are higher and/or 
more consistent than what the market can typically offer.  However, 
the truly elite Ponzi schemers of today are much more subtle than 
was Mr. Ponzi, who promised an over-the-moon 50% return within 
ninety days of any investment.  The slickest of the modern Ponzi 
schemers tend to offer returns that, while certainly better than what 
investors could expect elsewhere, are still low enough to maintain a 
whiff of plausibility, and thus deter suspicion. 
As Anne Kates Smith observes, in the modern era of Ponzi 
schemes, 
[K]nowing better isn’t easy.  Ponzi operations are typ-
ically light-years more sophisticated than the Nigerian 
money-transfer scams caught by your e-mail spam fil-
ter.  As fraud expert and SEC trial counsel Pat Hud-
dleston is fond of saying, “If it sounds too good to be 
true, you’re dealing with an amateur.”  Madoff and his 
ilk don’t promise the moon; the returns they offer, al-
beit fictitious, are plausible.43
 
High (but still plausible) returns, consistently delivered over a 
period of time, are generally much more consistent with the expecta-
tions of investors and are therefore much less likely to raise red flags, 
as compared to the otherworldly returns that Mr. Ponzi offered.44  
Accordingly, the smartest of the modern Ponzi operators have made 
their schemes more difficult to weed out. 
Fifth, modern Ponzi operators have become adept at lending 
their operations the appearance of professional legitimacy, which in 
turn makes the schemes harder to spot.  Again, we glean insight from 
our Jamaican Ponzi investor: 
[t]he schemes looked legit: Some schemes sent 
monthly statements.  Others allowed investors to 
check their statements on-line.  One or two of them 
even had . . . nicely appointed offices with attractive 
staff members falling over themselves to do your bid-
 
42 Pilmer & Cramer, supra note 30, at 24. 
43 Smith, supra note 34. 
44 Id. 
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ding.  In other words, the schemes ran what seemed 
like legitimate, professional operations.45 
Mr. Madoff, for instance, rented extravagant offices in one of 
the more expensive buildings in New York City, replete with teams 
of busy underlings.46  Additionally, a sophisticated computer program 
enabled him to create very professional-looking account statements—
but the statements were phony.47  They purported to account for in-
vestor dividends by documenting potentially hundreds of securities 
transactions, most of which never took place.48  Through these and 
other tactics, Mr. Madoff was able to make his enterprise seem like a 
real top-flight business, rather than the fraud that it was. 
Sixth, the best Ponzi schemers are generally able to exploit 
their victims’ natural yearning for social status.  Counterintuitive 
though it may seem, oftentimes a Ponzi schemer may deliberately 
play “hard to get,” and he may even turn some potential investors 
away.49  This creates the impression that those afforded the “privi-
lege” of investing with the schemes are members of an “exclusive 
club.”50  We all want to be members of exclusive clubs.  Indeed,“our 
craving for social status explains why, when Ponzi perpetrators try to 
turn would-be investors away, [the investors] fight all the harder to 
get in on the ‘exclusive’ opportunity.  Sophistication is no defense: 
Educated investors are often too confident in their own capacity to 
evaluate a deal.”51 
Mr. Madoff exploited this phenomenon masterfully.  As Pro-
fessor Colins observes, 
[Madoff] played hard to get.  When approached by po-
tential investors, [Madoff] typically told them his in-
vestment fund was closed, having reached its peak ca-
pacity.  Then he’d re-contact them and offer a huge 
favor by reopening the fund just for them.  [Accord-
ingly], having [Madoff] manage their money became a 
 
45 Skulduggery, supra note 31. 
46 See Colins, supra note 26, at 441-42. 
47 Id. at 442. 
48 Id. at 440. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 34. 
51 Id. 
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status symbol.52 
Consequently, the Ponzi operator who can impart an air of 
exclusivity to his scheme can lure many status-hungry investors who 
may otherwise (wisely) refrain from contributing. 
V. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE DOWNFALL OF A PONZI 
SCHEME, WITHOUT A SYSTEM OF ORDERLY LIQUIDATION, 
SUCH AS BANKRUPTCY? 
Three great problems typically accompany the downfall of 
any Ponzi scheme.  The first (and worst) is the fact that many Ponzi 
victims can never be made truly whole, no matter what remedies the 
law provides.  Due to the inherent insolvency of the scheme, the val-
ue of the assets available for distribution can never equal the victims’ 
legitimate claims.53  The other two problems manifest most acutely 
without a system of orderly liquidation such as bankruptcy.  They 
are: (1) the race to the bank; and (2) the race to the courthouse. 
The race to the bank is a phenomenon typically seen near the 
end of a Ponzi scheme when the fraud begins to come to light.  Here 
(as happened in Charles Ponzi’s case), investors rush to the bank (or 
wherever they get their payouts from the scheme) in order to with-
draw their investments before the entire operation falls apart.54  The 
investors who arrive first stand to receive substantial payments, while 
those who arrive later often wind up with nothing.55 
Disappointed at the “bank,” this latter group may “race to the 
courthouse” to file lawsuits against the Ponzi scheme, its operators, 
and even one another, all in an effort to recoup whatever they can out 
of whatever is left after the race to the bank.56  Again, here some in-
vestors may enjoy meaningful recovery, while some will be left with 
nothing.
 57 
Much inequity results from the races to the bank and court-
house.  The Ponzi victims trying to exercise their own, independent 
remedies are all situated in the same equitable position vis-à-vis the 
 
52 See Colins, supra note 26, at 440. 
53 Lustig v. Weisz & Assoc., Inc. (In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343, 
349 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted). 
54 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 10-11. 
55 Id. at 11. 
56 Andrew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
939, 960 (2012). 
57 Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 11. 
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scheme, its assets, and each other.
 58  Accordingly, and for reasons 
explored in more detail, it is an affront to equity for one Ponzi victim 
to recover a higher percentage of her investment than any other in-
vestor.
 59  Relatedly, the fact that the Ponzi victims who participate in 
the race to the courthouse are asserting the same rights to the same 
limited pool of assets threatens to breed duplicative and wasteful liti-
gation; this may consume large sums that could otherwise be distrib-
uted to the victims.60 
Accordingly, without some means to halt the races to the bank 
and courthouse, and without some system of orderly liquidation and 
distribution to claimants, Ponzi victims are essentially left to a feed-
ing frenzy, which stands to generate much inequity and disappoint-
ment, while doing little that will actually make the victims of the 
scheme whole.  A chapter 7 liquidation under the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code offers an effective means to address these problems. 
VI. CHAPTER 7 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 
At the commencement of a bankruptcy case, an “estate” is cre-
ated, which is generally comprised of “all legal [and] equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case . . . 
wherever located and by whomever held.”61  In a chapter 7 liquida-
tion, the fiduciary in charge of the estate is not the debtor or its prin-
cipals, but rather an independent “trustee in bankruptcy,” usually ap-
pointed by the Office of the United States Trustee.62  The goal of the 
chapter 7 trustee is not to save the debtor’s business (if any), but ra-
ther to marshal the assets of the estate and liquidate them expedi-
tiously for the benefit of creditors (including Ponzi victims).63  An 
immediate advantage here is that those who ran the scheme pre-
bankruptcy are divested of control.  This offers comfort to Ponzi vic-
tims that the “foxes” who looted the “henhouse” have been displaced 
 
58 See Kull, supra note 56, at 953. 
59 Id. at 954. 
60 Id. at 960.  This brings to mind Charles Dickens’ classic novel, Bleak House, wherein 
an entire testamentary estate was consumed by the cost of litigating over it in the English 
Courts of Chancery, leaving nothing for the rightful beneficiaries.  CHARLES DICKENS, 
BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853), available at 
http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/lit/charlesdickens/BleakHouse/chap1.html. 
61 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2010).  There are exceptions to this, set forth largely in 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 522, 541(b) (2010). 
62 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 703, 704 (2010). 
63 11 U.S.C. § 704. 
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by a disinterested fiduciary acting under the supervision of the Bank-
ruptcy Court. 
Otherwise, perhaps the most effective solution that the Bank-
ruptcy Code offers to the problems posed by the races to the bank and 
the courthouse is the “automatic stay” of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), as sup-
plemented by the equitable powers of the Bankruptcy Court under 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a).64  The automatic stay generally bars any act against 
the debtor to collect upon any claim that came into being prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition.65  Obviously, for a Ponzi investor to 
withdraw his or her pre-bankruptcy investment in the debtor is an 
“act to collect” upon a pre-bankruptcy claim, since the investor is at-
tempting to satisfy a pre-bankruptcy right to payment.66  Therefore, 
such actions come within the scope of the automatic stay.  Accord-
ingly, once the bankruptcy commences, Ponzi victims are forbidden 
by law from attempting to withdraw their investments in the debtor.  
This stops the “race to the bank” dead in its tracks. 
The automatic stay also stops the “race to the courthouse.”  
First, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) prohibits the “continuation or com-
mencement” of most kinds of lawsuits that were or could have been 
commenced against the debtor pre-petition.67  Accordingly, Ponzi in-
vestors who come up short after the “race to the bank” are forbidden 
by law from suing the debtor directly. 
However, the automatic stay would not seem to prohibit de-
frauded investors from suing one another, as well as any affiliates or 
insiders of the debtor (such as the principals of an artificial entity 
used to run a Ponzi scheme), as by its terms it only applies to actions 
and proceedings against the debtor.
 68  This is important, because out-
side of bankruptcy, Ponzi victims would in many cases possess equi-
table rights of action against each other, in restitution and unjust en-
richment, as well as claims against the insiders and affiliates of the 
debtor.69 
 
64 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010); see also 11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2010). 
65 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1-8).  There are limitations on the scope of the automatic stay, set 
forth in other subsections of 11 U.S.C. § 362, most notably subsections (b) and (d).  Id. 
66 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (providing an “act to collect” operates as a stay), with 
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2010) (defining “claim” as, among other things, “any right to pay-
ment”). 
67 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1). 
68 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somme eds., 16th 
ed. 2013) [hereinafter COLLIER]. 
69 For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Kull, supra note 56. 
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The reason Ponzi victims may have claims against one anoth-
er is that, under basic principles of restitution, where the cash contri-
butions of defrauded Ponzi investors have been un-traceably com-
mingled into one fund (as is the usual case), no one investor has any 
entitlement to any specific portion of the fund.  Rather, “[t]he recov-
ery belongs to the victims jointly, in proportion to their losses.”70  
Accordingly, given the inevitably limited assets available for distri-
bution to Ponzi victims, each victim who recovers more than his/her 
pro rata share from the Ponzi fund is unjustly enriched at the expense 
of others who got less.71  This, in turn, gives rise to an equitable claim 
in restitution in favor of all victims who got less than their pro rata 
share of the available assets, and against each similarly-situated vic-
tim who received more. 
Relatedly, it goes without saying that, very often, Ponzi inves-
tors have rights of action in law and equity against the affiliates, of-
ficers, directors, and management of entities that were used to per-
petuate Ponzi schemes.72 
If the Bankruptcy Court were not empowered to stop Ponzi 
victims from suing one another, as well as insiders and affiliates of 
the debtor, then many Ponzi bankruptcies would be impossible to 
administer.  These ancillary lawsuits would necessarily impede the 
trustee as she seeks to marshal estate property for distribution, since 
the trustee and the victims would be competing for the same limited 
pool of assets—while compounding everyone’s misery and loss 
through duplicative, wasteful litigation.  The resulting confusion 
would render the trustee unable to act effectively for the benefit of 
victims and creditors at large.73 
Fortunately, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) permits the Bankruptcy Court 
to enjoin these ancillary lawsuits if they bear a close enough nexus 
with the bankruptcy case.74  Once this is done, the trustee is empow-
 
70 Id. at 953 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
59(4) (2011)). 
71 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59(4) (2011); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 cmt. f (2011) 
(explaining that, under the law of restitution, Ponzi investors may generally keep dividends 
that represent a return of principal, but no profits). 
72 COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 362.03. 
73 See Kull, supra note 56, at 960 (“[I]t is essential that the victims' restitution claims be 
aggregated and prosecuted together.”). 
74 11 U.S.C. §105(a); see also Secs. Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. 
Secs. (In re Madoff), 443 B.R. 295, 315 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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ered, on behalf of the general body of claimants, to assert claims 
against both the former operators of the scheme and the Ponzi inves-
tors who got more than their pro rata share.75  Proceeds of these law-
suits are then absorbed into the estate for ratable distribution.76 
In light of all this, we see how that the automatic stay, sup-
plemented by the powers of the Bankruptcy Court under 11 U.S.C. § 
105(a), may serve to halt the races to the bank and the courthouse, 
and thereby preserve the assets of the estate for the benefit of Ponzi 
victims. 
VII. THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS: TRUSTEE V. DEFRAUDED 
INVESTOR 
However, the automatic stay and the Bankruptcy Court’s in-
junctive powers are largely proactive solutions that can only go so 
far; although highly effective in terms of stopping any ongoing dam-
age resulting from the races to the bank and the courthouse, they of-
ten cannot reach back in time and undo whatever damage had already 
been done.  This is where the Trustee comes in.  The trustee’s job is 
to recapture excess returns paid out to some Ponzi investors, for rata-
ble distribution to all, so long as those funds would have been estate 
property if not paid out.77  As most Ponzi investors are reluctant to 
disgorge any part of their returns, litigation ensues, pitting the trustee 
against many of the people for whose benefit s/he is charged to act. 
This adversarial process is rife with pitfalls, both for the trus-
tee on the one side, and the investors on the other.  The Bankruptcy 
Code gives the trustee an arsenal of avoidance actions that s/he can 
use to force Ponzi investors to disgorge excess returns.  This article 
discusses two: preference actions under 11 U.S.C. § 54778 and 
fraudulent transfer actions under 11 U.S.C. § 548.79  Nevertheless, the 
Bankruptcy Code also gives investors many defenses, which may en-
able them to keep some portion of their returns from the Ponzi 
 
75 Kull, supra note 56, at 958. 
76 Fisher v. Apostolou, 155 F.3d 876, 880, 883 (7th Cir.1998); see also In re Madoff, 443 
B.R. at 311; Kull, supra note 56, at 967 n.46; see also Fisher, 155 F.3d at 879 (providing 
that the Trustee is not empowered to assert claims arising out of particularized injuries suf-
fered by individual claimants, or claims belonging to a specific creditor and not to the body 
of defrauded victims as a whole). 
77 See Kull, supra note 56, at 958. 
78 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2010). 
79 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2005). 
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scheme. 
 
(1). Preference Actions 
 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) sets forth the basic elements of the trus-
tee’s prima facie case for avoidance of a “preference.”  It provides as 
follows: 
[With certain exceptions], the trustee may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by 
the debtor before such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made— 
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before 
the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at 
the time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than 
such creditor would receive if— 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this 
title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such 
debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this ti-
tle.80 
It is worth nothing that the preference statute is basically in-
different to whether payments to the Ponzi investor represent a return 
of principal or a net gain, and to factors like “good faith” or “reason-
ably equivalent value.”  Accordingly, barring some defenses, the trus-
tee can usually recover every penny an investor received from the 
scheme during the preference period.81 
The first requirement of a preferential transfer is that the 
 
80 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
81 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 181 (“The potential advantage of a preference action 
is that it allows the trustee to recover the return of an investor's principal, even though the 
investor made the investment in both subjective and objective good faith (and thus would 
have a defense to any fraudulent conveyance action).”). 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/3
2014] PONZI SCHEMES IN BANKRUPTCY 517 
transfer be “of an interest of the debtor in property.”82  Some have ar-
gued that the funds that a Ponzi debtor raised by defrauding investors 
were never the debtor’s property in the first place.83  They contend 
that, because the debtor obtained the funds by fraud, the debtor is un-
justly enriched at the expense of the victims.84  Therefore, the debtor 
held the funds in trust for the benefit of the victims.85  A similar ar-
gument is that the Ponzi debtor obtained the funds by “theft,” and 
therefore had no real “title” to the funds.86  Accordingly, any pay-
ments from a Ponzi debtor to its investors cannot constitute a transfer 
of an interest of the debtor in property because the debtor never had 
any legal interest in the funds.87 
Courts consistently reject such arguments.  First, a construc-
tive trust is a remedy without effect until a court decrees it, so it con-
veys no equitable ownership in anything until then.88  Second, it is 
true that one who obtains property through outright larceny has no 
title.89  However, one who convinces someone to turn property over 
to him voluntarily, albeit through fraud, has an “interest” in that 
property, if only a “possessory interest,” or “voidable title.”90  Hence, 
a transfer of funds from the Ponzi debtor to its investors is one of “an 
interest of the debtor in property.”91 
The next requirement is that the transfer must have been “to 
or for the benefit of a creditor.”92  Each defrauded Ponzi investor who 
loses money is a “creditor” for purposes of the preference statute.93  
Under principles of restitution, the Ponzi investor acquires an incho-
ate claim for unjust enrichment against the Ponzi debtor to the extent 
of her “net loss”—that is, to the extent her aggregate investment ex-
ceeds her ultimate recovery.94  This is because the debtor is unjustly 
 
82 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
83 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 161. 
84 Id. at 161-62. 
85 Id. at 162. 
86 Id. at 161. 
87 See, e.g., Jobin v. Lalan (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co., Inc.), 160 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 1993); see also Kull, supra note 56; McDermott, supra note 18, at 161. 
88 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 161-62. 
89 See Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 171 N.E. 569, 571 (N.Y. 1930). 
90 Phelps v. McQuade, 115 N.E. 441, 441-42 (N.Y. 1917). 
91 See Jobin, 160 B.R. at 857; accord McDermott, supra note 18, at 162-63. 
92 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1). 
93 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 182. 
94 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67(1)(c) 
cmt. f (2011); McDermott, supra note 18, at 168. 
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enriched to the extent it obtains funds through fraud.95  (Of course, a 
transfer of funds from the scheme to the investor is obviously “to” the 
investor, or for his/her “benefit.”)  However, for reasons we will dis-
cuss more fully infra, a Ponzi investor’s legitimate claim against the 
Ponzi debtor in restitution lies only to the extent of her “net loss.”  
Accordingly, some courts have held that the trustee may only use the 
preference statute to recapture returns of principal, and may not use it 
to recapture “net profits” that investors obtain from the scheme.96 
Next, the transfer must have been “for or on account of an an-
tecedent debt.”97  A debt is “antecedent” to the transfer when it arises 
prior to the transfer.98  A Ponzi investor’s inchoate claim for restitu-
tion against the Ponzi debtor arises at the moment the investor con-
tributes.99  Accordingly, any subsequent payments to the investor are 
made on account of antecedent debt.100 
Next, the debtor must have been “insolvent” at the time of the 
transfer.101  The preference statute itself rebuttably presumes that the 
debtor was insolvent within ninety days before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition.102  Moreover, for purposes of the preference statute, 
“insolvency” is generally measured by the extent to which the debt-
or’s liabilities exceed a fair valuation of its assets (except for, inter 
 
95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (with com-
ments) (2011); see also McDermott, supra note 18, at 182-83; 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 101(10) 
(defining “claim” and “creditor”).  Depending on the nature of the arrangement between the 
investor and the Ponzi debtor, this general proposition might not hold true in every case.  See 
McDermott, supra note 18, at 182 n.108. 
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 (with com-
ments) (2011); see also McDermott, supra note 18, at 182, 183 (citing Wootton v. Barge (In 
re Ronald Cohen), 875 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1989)).  Thus, for example, suppose Investor 
contributes $100,000 to Ponzi.  Before Ponzi’s bankruptcy, Investor withdraws his $100,000 
of principal, plus an additional $10,000 of fictitious profits, all within the preference period.  
Under the reasoning of Wootton, only $100,000 principal could be recaptured by the trustee 
under the preference statute, since Investor’s inchoate claim in restitution against Ponzi only 
extends to his $100,000 principal investment.  The trustee would have to resort to another 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code—such as the fraudulent transfer provisions of 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 544 and 548—in order to recapture the remaining $10,000. 
97 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2). 
98 Id.; Southmark Corp. v. Schulte, Roth, & Zabel (In re Southmark Corp.), 88 F.3d 311, 
316 (5th Cir. 1996). 
99 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 182. 
100 See Danning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
101 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3). 
102 11 U.S.C. § 547(f); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. v. Sabrina 
(In re R.M.L., Inc.), 195 B.R. 602, 611 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996). 
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alia, “property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud . . . creditors,” which is also presumed in Ponzi 
cases).103  Recall that, the more money a Ponzi scheme raises from 
defrauded investors, the more its liabilities exceed the value of its as-
sets.  Accordingly, most courts presume that a Ponzi scheme is insol-
vent from its very inception, leaving the preference defendant to 
prove otherwise.104 
The next element of a preference action is that the preferential 
transfer must have taken place within a very specific period of 
time.105  Generally, that period is ninety days before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.106  However, where the transfer was to an “insid-
er” of the debtor, the reach-back period extends to one year pre-
petition.107  This temporal limitation often dramatically reduces the 
effectiveness of the preference statute as a means for the trustee to re-
cover payments made to Ponzi investors because many Ponzi 
schemes have existed for years by the time they get to Bankruptcy 
Court and most investors with such schemes are not insiders.108 
Lastly, the trustee must establish that the Ponzi “investor re-
ceived more than he would have received as an unsecured creditor in 
a [chapter 7] liquidation of the debtor’s estate.”109  Because the assets 
available for distribution in the typical Ponzi case virtually never 
equal the claims of defrauded investors, this element is usually fairly 
easy to meet.110 
Though 11 U.S.C. § 547 outlines several preference-specific 
defenses available, Ponzi investors typically assert three: (1) the 
“subsequent new value” defense; (2) the “contemporaneous exchange 
for new value” defense; and, (3) the “ordinary course of business” de-
fense.111 
 
103 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A)(i).  Various state fraudulent transfer laws contain similar defi-
nitions of insolvency.  See McDermott, supra note 18, at 171. 
104 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 171. 
105 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
108 Kenneth E. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Code and Ponzi Schemes: Good Luck, You’ll Need 
It!, 31 BANKR. CT. DEC. NEWS 1 (Feb. 3, 1998). 
109 McDermott, supra note 18, at 183-184; 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5). 
110 McDermott, supra note 18, at 184 (cautioning, however, that “if the investor received 
less than his principal investments, then his percentage return must be compared to the esti-
mated percentage return to all creditors in a liquidation.”). 
111 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(c); see McDermott, supra note 18, at 184 (explaining that 
“Ponzi investors usually assert either new value defenses the ordinary course of defense, or 
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A. The “Subsequent New Value” Defense 
The “subsequent new value” defense is found in 11 U.S.C. § 
547(c)(4).112  This defense is basically meant to permit a creditor to 
retain otherwise avoidable preferential payments to the extent that: 
(1) subsequent to receiving the preference, the creditor gave the debt-
or “new value”113 as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2); and (2) the 
debtor made no unavoidable transfer to the creditor on account of 
such “new value.”  The “new value” defense thus permits a creditor 
to offset subsequent transfers of “new value” to the debtor against 
prior preferential payments.114 
Now to illustrate the basic concept with an example that is 
(admittedly) a great deal simpler than what is likely to be encoun-
tered in actual practice: 
Example: Investor contributes $100,000 to Ponzi on 
January 1, 2014.  On January 31, 2014, Ponzi returns 
$50,000 to Investor (a preferential transfer).  On Feb-
ruary 8, 2014, Investor contributes an additional 
$30,000 to Ponzi, which meets the definition of “new 
value” under 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2).  After Ponzi files 
for bankruptcy, Trustee sues Investor to recover the 
$50,000 payment of January 31 as a preference under 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  Here, Trustee’s recovery will be 
limited to $20,000, since the “subsequent new value” 
defense permits Investor to essentially offset the sub-
sequent $30,000 contribution of “new value” against 
the prior $50,000 preferential payment, leaving only 
$20,000 for Trustee to recapture as a preference.115  
 
both”). 
112 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (providing that the trustee may not avoid a preferential transfer: 
“[T]o or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave 
new value to or for the benefit of the debtor—(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable 
security interest; and (B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an other-
wise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor”). 
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (stating that, for preference purposes:“ ‘[N]ew value’ means 
money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of prop-
erty previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable 
by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, 
but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation”). 
114 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 184. 
115 Robert H. Bowmar, The New Value Exception to the Trustee’s Preference Avoidance 
Power: Getting the Computations Straight, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 70 (1995); see also Ger-
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The $100,000 initial investment cannot be used to off-
set any part of the $50,000 preferential payment, since 
§ 547(c)(4) is clear that only new value provided sub-
sequent to a preferential payment may be used to off-
set the preferential payment. 
Many complexities attend the application of the “subsequent 
new value” defense; one is worth mentioning here.  “New value” for 
purposes of Section 547 only consists of “money or money’s worth in 
goods, services,” and other things.116  Often, rather than making fresh 
cash contributions to Ponzi schemes, investors will simply “roll over” 
their fictitious profits into new “investments” in the scheme.  Because 
the “profits” generated by a Ponzi scheme have no real economic 
substance, some courts refuse to treat the rollover of fictitious profits 
as the provision of “new value” for purposes of the “subsequent new 
value” defense.117  Additionally, 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) expressly pro-
vides that “new value . . . does not include an obligation substituted 
for an existing obligation.”118  One commentator has argued that 
“new value” credit should not be given for rollovers here because a 
rollover merely constitutes the substitution of one obligation for an-
other.119 
B. The “Contemporaneous Exchange for New Value” 
Defense 
The “contemporaneous exchange for new value” defense is 
provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), under which the trustee may 
not avoid an otherwise preferential transfer “to the extent that such 
transfer was—(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for 
whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous ex-
change for new value given to the debtor; and (B) in fact a substan-
tially contemporaneous exchange.”120  The purpose of this defense is 
to preserve transactions that do not have the net effect of diminishing 
 
ald B. Kirksey, A Simplified Approach to Preference Calculations—Section 547(c)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the “At Risk” Rule, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 257-58 
(1987) (providing a detailed example). 
116 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2). 
117 See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1997). 
118 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2). 
119 McDermott, supra note 18, at 184. 
120 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1). 
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the estate that will ultimately be available for the benefit of creditors, 
in that the creditor gave the debtor “new value” in exchange for the 
otherwise preferential payment.121 
The first element of the “contemporaneous exchange” defense 
is subjective—that is, “[t]here must be some manifest desire by the 
parties that the exchange contemporaneously grant money or mon-
ey’s worth in new credit, goods, services, or property to the debt-
or.”122  This element has teeth; even if the exchange winds up being 
substantially contemporaneous through fortuitous happenstance, the 
defense will not apply unless the parties actually, subjectively intend-
ed it to be contemporaneous at the time of the preferential transfer.123 
The second element is objective—that is, the exchange must, 
in fact, have been “substantially contemporaneous,” apart from what 
the parties intended.124  This determination “requires a case-by-case 
inquiry into all relevant circumstances (e.g., length of delay, reason 
for delay, nature of the transaction, intentions of the parties, possible 
risk of fraud) surrounding an allegedly preferential transfer.”125  The 
modifier “substantially” makes it clear that the exchange does not 
need to be exactly simultaneous, so there is some room for a slight 
time interval between the preferential payment and the provision of 
new value to which it relates.126 
Lastly, the “contemporaneous exchange” defense only oper-
ates to the extent of new value given.127  A simple example of the op-
eration of this defense follows: 
Example: Investor contributes $100,000 to Ponzi on 
January 1, 2014.  On February 2, 2014, Ponzi pays In-
vestor $50,000 in exchange for Investor’s late-model 
luxury SUV.  Investor delivers the SUV on February 
6. After Ponzi files for bankruptcy, Trustee seeks to 
 
121 See Anderson-Smith & Assocs., Inc., v. Xyplex, Inc. (In re Anderson-Smith & 
Assocs., Inc.), 188 B.R. 679, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995). 
122 See id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
123 See COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 547.04. 
124 See Danning, 836 F.2d at 1219. 
125 Pine Top Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 969 F.2d 321, 328 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
126 See id. (finding that courts have tended to use, as a guideline, the grace period for per-
fection of security interests found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)).  That period has varied over 
time, but is currently 30 days. The Ninth Circuit once held that a delay of 75 days was too 
long.  See Danning, 836 F.2d at 1219. 
127 COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 547.04. 
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avoid the $50,000 payment of February 2 as a prefer-
ence.  The evidence at trial shows that the SUV was 
worth only $35,000 at the time Ponzi purchased it.  
Investor was aware of this, but he assumed Ponzi 
would treat the $15,000 surplus as a partial return of 
Investor’s prior $100,000 contribution of January 1.  
Ponzi did, in fact, so treat the surplus.  Under these 
facts, Trustee may avoid only $15,000 of the $50,000 
payment of February 2.  The rest corresponds to the 
value of the SUV given in exchange.  The fact that the 
SUV was delivered within four days of payment sug-
gests that the exchange was intended to be contempo-
raneous, and was substantially contemporaneous. 
C. The “Ordinary Course of Business” Defense 
Another defense that Ponzi investors commonly invoke is the 
“ordinary course of business” defense, set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 
547(c)(2), which provides that the trustee may not avoid an otherwise 
preferential transfer: 
to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a 
debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the 
transferee, and such transfer was— 
(A) made in the ordinary course of business or 
financial affairs of the debtor and the transfer-
ee; or 
(B) made according to ordinary business 
terms.128 
Thorough treatment of § 547(c)(2) is well beyond the scope of 
this article.  It will suffice for us to note that many courts have held 
flatly that a defrauded Ponzi investor simply cannot (as a matter of 
law) use this defense to shield Ponzi returns from a trustee’s prefer-
ence powers.129  The reasoning is that such payments are made in fur-
therance of a Ponzi scheme, which generally has no legitimate busi-
 
128 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). 
129 See Sender v. Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 48 F.3d 470, 
475 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing several cases determining that this defense “does not apply in 
the context of a Ponzi scheme”). 
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ness in the “ordinary course” of which the debt could have been in-
curred, or the payments made.
 130  Some also reason that no “ordinary 
business” ever pays out fictitious profits, as a Ponzi scheme does, so 
payments by a Ponzi scheme to its investors cannot be “made accord-
ing to ordinary business terms.”131 
VIII. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER CLAIMS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 548 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) contains the heart of the trustee’s bank-
ruptcy-specific fraudulent-transfer avoidance powers. 
 
(1) Transfers Made with Actual Fraudulent Intent 
 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A), if the Ponzi debtor trans-
ferred any property to a Ponzi investor within two years pre-
bankruptcy, and if it did so with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud any present or future creditor,” then the transfer is avoidable 
whether it represents a return of principal or “fictitious profits,” sub-
ject to any applicable defenses.132  Moreover, the state of mind of the 
investor receiving the payment is irrelevant.133  All that matters is 
whether the debtor (or its agents) possessed the requisite fraudulent 
intent at the time of the transfer.134 
The trustee’s burden of proving fraudulent intent, in the con-
text of a Ponzi debtor, is eased by the so-called “Ponzi scheme pre-
sumption.”  As Collier on Bankruptcy notes, 
most courts hold that “[p]roof of a Ponzi scheme is suffi-
cient to establish the Ponzi operator’s actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud creditors for purposes of actual-
ly fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 
548(a)(1).”  Some courts go further and under some cir-
 
130 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 186.  Some courts have applied this blanket prohibi-
tion not only to defrauded investors seeking to shield their returns from the scheme, but also 
to non-investor creditors, like trade vendors and utility providers.  Other courts apply it only 
to defrauded investors seeking to shield returns.  See id. 
131 See, e.g., Sender, 48 F.3d at 476 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
132 See COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 548.04[1] (internal citation and quotation marks omit-
ted).  We discussed the issues of whether the transfer was one of “an interest in property of 
the debtor” earlier, in connection with preference actions. 
133 COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 548.04[2]. 
134 Id. 
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cumstances make the presumption irrebutable [sic].135 
Many courts require that the payment be made “ ‘in further-
ance’ of the Ponzi scheme” in order for the presumption to apply.136  
Virtually every payment from a Ponzi scheme to its investors, relat-
ing to their investment, will have been made “in furtherance of” the 
scheme.  Remember that, if the Ponzi debtor did not pay handsome 
returns to early investors, then it could hardly attract the new inves-
tors it needs to keep the scam afloat.  Accordingly, any such payment 
is made “in furtherance of” the scheme. 137 
 
(2). Constructively Fraudulent Transfers. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) permits the trustee to avoid the 
transfer of any interest of the debtor in property to the extent that (1) 
the debtor did not receive “reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” 
and (2) at least one of four additional factors is present.138  Of these 
four, the most important factor, for our purposes, is that the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the transfer.139 Transfers under § 
548(a)(1)(B) are typically referred to as “constructively fraudulent 
transfers.”140 
For purposes of § 548, “ ‘value’ means property, or satisfac-
tion . . . of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor.”141  According-
ly, the trustee may not avoid a transfer, as constructively fraudulent, 
to the extent that the debtor received satisfaction of a present or ante-
cedent debt in exchange.  This rule raises some interesting issues in 
Ponzi cases. 
Recall that every defrauded investor in a Ponzi scheme has a 
claim in restitution against the scheme to the extent of his or her “net 
loss” (aggregate investment minus aggregate returns).  Each dollar 
that the Ponzi investor gets from the scheme correspondingly satisfies 
one dollar of that claim, (and, hence, gives “reasonably equivalent 
value” to the debtor), at least up to the point where the investor 
 
135 Id. ¶ 548.04[3][b] (internal citations omitted). 
136 Manhattan, 379 B.R. at 13. 
137 Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275 B.R. 641, 656 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002). 
138 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(B)(i-ii). 
139 Id. 
140 COLLIER, supra note 68, ¶ 548.05. 
141 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A). 
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breaks even.  Conversely, payments representing a net positive return 
to the investor do not represent “reasonably equivalent value” since 
they exceed what is necessary to satisfy the restitution claim.
 142 
The refusal of many courts to consider even one penny of re-
covery, past the break-even point, to represent “reasonably equivalent 
value” to the debtor is a source of some controversy.  After all, the 
plain language of most agreements between Ponzi debtors and their 
investors call for the investors to receive net positive returns.  Should 
not payment of the contractual “profits” under an agreement consti-
tute satisfaction of a debt and, hence, represent “reasonably equiva-
lent value”?  Most courts say no.  They reason that any agreement in 
furtherance of a Ponzi scam is illegal and unenforceable as against 
public policy.143  An unenforceable agreement cannot give rise to any 
lawful debt, satisfaction of which could give the debtor “reasonably 
equivalent value.”144  Notwithstanding, the investor acquires an equi-
table claim for unjust enrichment, but only to the extent of her “net 
loss.”145  The “net loss” limitation is imposed, because, as we have 
discussed, any “net winners” are unjustly enriched at the expense of 
the “net losers” to the extent their returns exceed their investments.146  
Accordingly, only to the extent of an investor’s “net loss” will the 
courts recognize a valid debt, satisfaction of which is “reasonably 
equivalent value.”147 
In the more sophisticated Ponzi schemes, an investor’s “net 
loss” might be obscured in a maze of separate transactions and ac-
counting gimmicks.  Even so, the true measure of “net loss” is noth-
ing more or less than the difference between (1) the number of dollars 
that the investor put into the scheme and (2) the number of dollars 
 
142 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67; see also 
McDermott, supra note 18, at 164-67 (explaining that some courts require a finding of objec-
tive “good faith” on the part of the investor before they will recognize payments to her, from 
the Ponzi debtor, as providing “reasonably equivalent value” to the debtor).  This, however, 
seems to make the “reasonably equivalent value” analysis unnecessarily redundant of the 
affirmative “good faith defense” of 11 U.S.C. § 548(c), which we will discuss.  See infra, 
p.528-30. 
143 See, e.g., Floyd, 209 B.R. at 434 (internal citation omitted). 
144 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67 cmt. i. 
145 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 169. 
146 Id. 
147 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 169 (discussing various cases); accord 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 67; but see Daly v. 
Deptula (In re Carozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480 (D. Conn. 2002); see also Kull, su-
pra note 56, at 2 (opining that the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
would allow for interest in these circumstances). 
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she received from it, regardless of how the parties characterize the 
payments.148  To illustrate: 
Example: On January 1, 2014, Investor paid Ponzi 
$20,000, pursuant to a “short form investment agree-
ment.”  On January 15, January 31, February 5, and 
March 1, 2014, Investor and Ponzi executed similar 
agreements, with Investor contributing $20,000 each 
time, for an aggregate contribution of $100,000. 
Each “short form investment agreement” 
called for Investor to receive 20% interest every 
month on his outstanding principal, payable on the last 
day of each month.  Accordingly, on January 31, 
Ponzi paid investor $12,000 as “interest.”  On Febru-
ary 28, Ponzi paid Investor $16,000 as “interest.” On 
March 31, Ponzi paid Investor $20,000 as “interest.”  
On April 30, Ponzi paid Investor $20,000 as “inter-
est.”  On May 1, Investor withdrew $40,000 of “prin-
cipal” from his “investment account” with Ponzi.  Af-
ter this, Ponzi made no further payments to Investor. 
Total payments from Ponzi to Investor equal 
$108,000.  
Sometime later, Ponzi filed for bankruptcy.  
Trustee indicated that she will attempt to avoid all 
$108,000 of the payments from Ponzi to Investor as 
constructively fraudulent transfers under § 
548(a)(1)(B).  Assuming that all the other elements are 
met, Trustee will be successful insofar as she seeks to 
avoid the $8,000 that Investor received in excess of 
what he contributed, but she will not be able to avoid 
the remaining $100,000.  This is because Investor had 
an inchoate claim in restitution against Ponzi to the 
extent of his $100,000 investment.  Accordingly, the 
first $100,000 of payments from Ponzi to Investor rep-
resented a dollar-for-dollar reduction of that claim, 
and hence gave “reasonably equivalent value” to 
 
148 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 169 (“This may be the only workable rule in the typ-
ical Ponzi-scheme case, where documentation of transfers is less than complete, payments 
are sporadic and not always in accordance with the documentation of the investment, and 
neither the investor nor the debtor can recall precisely what the parties intended.”). 
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Ponzi for purposes of § 548(a)(1)(B).  However, In-
vestor had no valid claim in excess of his $100,000 
investment, because each “short form agreement” was 
illegal and unenforceable at law, and because Investor 
would be unjustly enriched insofar as he were permit-
ted to profit from the Ponzi scheme while other, simi-
larly-situated investors suffered loss.  Accordingly, 
Ponzi did not receive reasonably equivalent value for 
the remaining $8,000 of payments to Investor. 
As for the “insolvency” requirement, here the trustee is aided 
by the same “insolvency” presumption that applies in connection 
with preference actions.149  Therefore, if the trustee can establish that 
the investor received more than his or her principal investment within 
the reach-back period, then practically speaking that is all the 
Ttrustee will need to prove in most cases in order to avoid the excess 
payments under § 548(a)(1)(B).150 
 
(3). The “Good Faith” Defense of 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) 
 
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) provides as follows: 
Except to the extent that a transfer . . . voidable under 
this section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 
. . . a transferee . . . that takes for value and in good 
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest trans-
ferred . . . to the extent that such transferee . . . gave 
value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer . . . .151 
Accordingly, even a Ponzi investor who received an actual 
fraudulent transfer can retain it to the extent that she (1) gave “value” 
in exchange for the transfer, and (2) accepted the transfer in “good 
faith.”152  The “value” component of § 548(c) is identical to the “rea-
sonably equivalent value” prong under § 548(a)(1)(B) (although here 
it is the investor, and not the trustee, who bears the burden of proof).
 
153  Thus, if a Ponzi investor can prove that she took actual fraudulent 
transfers from the debtor in “good faith,” many courts hold that she 
 
149 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1995). 
150 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 173. 
151 11 U.S.C. § 548(c). 
152 Id. 
153 COLLIER, supra note 66, at §§ 548.03, 548.09[2]. 
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may keep them insofar as they do not represent a net “profit” from 
the scheme.154 
“Good faith” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. It is 
hardly addressed in the legislative history.155  Even so, most modern 
courts have developed a general framework for analyzing the issue.  
It seems obvious that an investor who is subjectively aware of the 
fraudulent nature of the Ponzi scheme or knowingly promotes it can-
not participate in “good faith.”156  Otherwise, the majority of courts 
and commentators agree that the standard for measuring “good faith” 
is objective, hinging on the reasonableness of the investor’s conduct 
in participating in the scheme and accepting the payments.157  The 
general inquiry has two basic steps: First, courts ask whether the 
transferee knew, or should have known, of circumstances that would 
place a reasonable, similarly-situated investor on notice that the debt-
or was either (A) running a Ponzi scheme and hence acting with actu-
al fraudulent intent in making the payment, or (B) insolvent.158  If so, 
the second step of the inquiry asks whether the transferee conducted a 
“diligent investigation” into the circumstances giving rise to the no-
tice, which may include an analysis of whether an investigation 
would have allayed a reasonable investor’s suspicions, or would have 
revealed the debtor’s fraud or insolvency.159  If a diligent investiga-
 
154 Id. at § 548.04[3][c].  However, some courts hold that the “good faith” defense is never 
(or virtually never) available to participants in a Ponzi scheme, either because a reasonable, 
similarly-situated investor would never have participated, or perhaps for fear of validating an 
illegal contract.  Id. 
155 Id. at § 548.09[2][b] 
156 See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 861-62 (D. Utah 
1987). 
157 See COLLIER, supra note 66, at §548.09[2][b];. see also, e.g., Jobin v. McKay (In re M 
& L Buc. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1996); but see, e.g., Meoli v. Hunting-
ton Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservs. Grp., Inc.), 444 B.R. 767, 773 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) 
(following a minority of cases adopting a “subjective” approach to “good faith,” based upon 
“traditional notions of honesty and integrity”). 
158 See Christian Bros. High Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re 
Bayou Grp., LLC), 439 B.R. 284, 315(S.D.N.Y. 2010).  This court notes that there was some 
confusion over whether the transferee must have had reason to know that the debtor made 
the specific payment with fraudulent intent, or whether the debtor’s operations generally 
were fraudulent.  Id.  As we have discussed, all payments from a Ponzi scheme to its inves-
tors, relating to their investment, are virtually certain to have been made with fraudulent in-
tent, because those payments are necessary in order to perpetuate the fraud.  Accordingly, 
objective reason to suspect the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme is likely reason enough to 
suspect that any specific payment to an investor in the scheme was made with fraudulent in-
tent. 
159 Id. at 316. 
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tion would have revealed the fraud/insolvency, and if the transferee 
did not conduct one, then good faith will likely be found lacking.160 
In this fact-intensive analysis, courts usually consider: the so-
phistication, intelligence, and other characteristics of the particular 
investor; the persuasiveness of the con-man running the Ponzi 
scheme, including the believability of his story; the extent to which 
the dividends paid out to prior investors could reasonably allay suspi-
cions about the scheme; whether the promised returns were so high as 
not to be reasonably believable; and similar factors.161 
IX. GENERAL DEFENSES TO AVOIDANCE ACTIONS 
(1). Limitations periods 
 
The Ponzi trustee seeking to recapture investors’ returns must 
work quickly, because the Bankruptcy Code imposes stringent dead-
lines by which the trustee must sue to (A) avoid a transfer, and (B) 
recover a transfer that has already been avoided.  11 U.S.C. § 546(a) 
provides that certain avoidance actions (including preference and 
fraudulent-transfer actions): 
may not be commenced after the earlier of— 
(1) the later of— 
(A) 2 years after the entry of the order for relief; or 
(B) 1 year after the appointment or election of the first 
trustee under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1202, or 1302 
of this title if such appointment or such election occurs 
before the expiration of the period specified in subpar-
agraph (A); or 
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.162 
Though the remedies of avoidance and recovery of transfers 
are often thought of as one remedy, they are quite distinct.  Accord-
ingly, better practice, where possible, seems to be to file consolidated 
actions in which the trustee simultaneously seeks both avoidance and 
recovery.  Failure to do so might result in the anomaly of a trustee be-
 
160 See COLLIER, supra note 66, at § 548.09[2][b]; see also Christian Bros., 439 B.R. 284 
at 316; Jobin, 84 F.3d at 1336, 1338. 
161 See McDermott, supra note 18, at 178-80 (surveying various cases). 
162 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). 
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ing unable to recover a transfer that s/he has successfully avoided.163 
 
(2). The “Good Faith” Defense of “Subsequent Transferees 
 
The Bankruptcy Code empowers the trustee to seek recovery 
(for the benefit of the estate) of an avoided transfer from either (1) 
the “initial” transferee of the debtor (that is, the entity which took di-
rectly from the debtor), or (2) any “mediate or immediate” transferee 
of the initial transferee.164  The trustee is only entitled to one satisfac-
tion.165 
An important question to answer at the outset here is that of 
just who constitutes a “transferee” for purposes of § 550.  Most 
courts require that, in order for the recipient of an avoided transfer to 
qualify as a “transferee,” that entity must have sufficient “dominion” 
or “control” over the property transferred, so that: 
they exercise legal control over the assets received, 
such that they have the right to use the assets for their 
own purposes, and not if they merely served as a con-
duit for assets that were under the actual control of the 
debtor-transferor or the real initial transferee.166 
Accordingly, a financial institution through which a Ponzi 
debtor transfers funds to an investor is not likely a “transferee” for 
purposes of § 550, since it is a “mere conduit.”167 
Example: Debtor has a deposit account with Bank. 
Debtor effectuates an avoidable transfer to Transferee 
1, in the amount of $50,000, by writing a check drawn 
against Debtor’s account at Bank.  Transferee 1 trans-
fers the cash to Transferee 2, who gives some of it to 
Transferee 3, who gives some to Transferee 4.  Bar-
 
163 See 5-550 COLLIER, supra note 66, ¶ 550.07. 
164 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1)-(2). 
165 See 11 U.S.C. § 550(d).  The requirement that the recovery be “for the benefit of the 
estate” is itself a meaningful limitation on the trustee’s recovery powers.  One implication is 
that the trustee may not recover a transfer when the result would not produce a benefit for 
the body of general, unsecured creditors, such as most cases where the proceeds would clear-
ly wind up going to the debtor (unless, perhaps, the recovery consists of exempt property for 
the benefit of an individual debtor).  See 5-550 COLLIER, supra note 66, ¶ 550.02. 
166 See, e.g., Andreini & Co. v. Pony Express Delivery Servs., 440 F.3d 1296, 1300-01 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
167 See 5-550 COLLIER, supra note 66, ¶ 550.02. 
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ring a defense, Trustee may seek recovery from Trans-
ferees 1-4 under § 550(a), since they all had control 
over the money.  Since Trustee is only entitled to one 
satisfaction, her aggregate recovery from all defend-
ants will be limited to $50,000 (with interest, etc).  
Trustee may not recover from Bank, as Bank is a 
“mere conduit.” 
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code offers special protection to 
“immediate or mediate” transferees of an “initial” transferee of the 
debtor.  Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) offers the immediate trans-
feree of the initial transferee of the debtor a defense to the extent that 
such a transferee takes (1) “for value” (including satisfaction of a 
present or antecedent debt); (2) in “good faith” and (3) without 
knowledge that the transfer was avoidable.168  Later transferees have 
the same defense, but they only need to prove “good faith,” provided 
that a transferee before them (other than the initial transferee) has 
proven good faith, value, and lack of knowledge.169  This defense is 
not available to the initial transferee of the debtor.170 
Example: In our prior example, Transferee 1 is the 
“initial transferee” of Debtor, since he took directly 
from Debtor (discounting Bank, which is a “mere 
conduit” and therefore not a “transferee”).  Since § 
550(b) by its terms does not apply to the initial trans-
feree of the debtor, Transferee 1 cannot make use of it.  
Transferee 2 is the “immediate transferee” of the ini-
tial transferee, since he took directly from Transferee 
1.  Accordingly, § 550(b) applies both to Transferee 2 
and to all of his immediate or mediate transferees—
that is, Transferees 3 and 4.  The precise elements that 
each transferee must prove in order to use § 550(b) 
will depend in part on where they are in the “chain” of 
transfers. 
    In order for Transferee 2 to prove the defense, he must 
prove value, good faith, and lack of knowledge.  If he 
does, then Transferees 3 and 4 need only prove good 
 
168 11 U.S.C. § 550(b). 
169 Id. 
170 Id.; accord 5-550 COLLIER, supra note 66, ¶ 550.03. 
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faith. 
    If Transferee 2 does not prove all three elements, then 
Transferee 3 must prove all three in order to use the 
defense. 
    If either Transferee 2 or 3 proves value, good faith, 
and lack of knowledge, then Transferee 4 need only 
prove good faith—but if not, then he must prove val-
ue, good faith, and lack of knowledge. 
 
Some courts interpret the “value” requirement of § 550(b) 
similarly to the requirement of “reasonably equivalent value” under § 
548(a)(2)(B), while others use the “fair market value” standard found 
elsewhere in the Code.  However, other courts (as well as Collier’s) 
prefer to define “value” under § 550(b) to mean value sufficient to 
support a simple contract.171  Further, in Ponzi cases, the modern 
trend seems to be to interpret the “good faith” requirement of § 
550(b) similarly to the “good faith” standard of § 548(c).172 
As for the requirement that the transfer be taken without 
knowledge of its avoidability, Collier’s offers the following insight: 
Neither the [Bankruptcy] Code nor the legisla-
tive history interprets this standard. The language . . . 
was included as surplusage to illustrate a transferee 
that could not be in good faith.  The Commission in-
tended the standard to mean “if the transferee knew 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the property [transferred] was recoverable.” 173 
 
However, the Eighth Circuit has remarked that: 
[i]f a transferee possesses knowledge of facts 
that suggest a transfer may be fraudulent, and further 
inquiry by the transferee would reveal facts sufficient 
to alert him that the property is recoverable, he cannot 
 
171 See discussion in 5-550 COLLIER, supra note 66, ¶ 550.03.  This standard would be 
similar to the standard for “value” that applies in the “bona fide purchaser for value” analysis 
at state law.  See id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing In re Sherman, infra, and noting also that not all courts treat the language as 
surplusage, but rather strive to impart independent meaning to it, raising the possibility that 
one might take in objective good faith, but still be subjectively aware that the transfer is 
avoidable). 
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sit on his heels, thereby preventing a finding that he 
has knowledge.  In such a situation, the transferee is 
held to have knowledge of the [a]voidability of the 
transfer.174 
 
(3). The Safe Harbor for Certain Payments Made in Connec-
tion with Securities Contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) 
 
11 U.S.C. § 546 contains a panoply of general defenses 
against avoidance actions; it would be well beyond the scope of this 
article to treat them all thoroughly.  One in particular, however, has 
stirred up much controversy: The safe harbor for certain payments 
made in connection with “securities contracts” under 11 U.S.C. § 
546(e).175  Section 546(e) is one of the more formidable sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  We can give it only surface treatment here. 
The text of the statute reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 
548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may 
not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as de-
fined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or set-
tlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of 
this title, made by or to (or for the benefit of) a com-
modity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbrok-
er, financial institution, financial participant, or securi-
ties clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by or to 
(or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward 
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, 
financial participant, or securities clearing agency, in 
connection with a securities contract, as defined in 
section 741(7), commodity contract, as defined in sec-
tion 761(4), or forward contract, that is made before 
the commencement of the case, except under section 
548(a)(1)(A) of this title.176 
A “margin payment” is unhelpfully defined as: 
payment or deposit of cash, a security, or other 
 
174 Brown v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Sherman), 67 F.3d 1348, 1357 (8th Cir. 1995). 
175 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). 
176 Id. 
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property, that is commonly known to the securities 
trade as original margin, initial margin, maintenance 
margin, or variation margin, or as a mark-to-market 
payment, or that secures an obligation of a participant 
in a securities clearing agency . . . .177 
Similarly, a “settlement payment” is unhelpfully defined as 
a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement 
payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement 
payment on account, a final settlement payment, or 
any other similar payment commonly used in the secu-
rities trade.178 
The definition of “settlement payments” is “somewhat circu-
lar.”179  However, the courts have defined “settlement payment” as a 
transfer of consideration, which completes a transaction in “securi-
ties.”180  This definition is “extremely broad.”181  This is so, in part, 
because the definition of “securities” in § 546(e) is much broader 
than what one may initially conceptualize when one thinks about “se-
curities transactions.”  Indeed, even a promissory note comes within 
the definition of “security” for purposes of § 546(e).182  Thus, even 
from this cursory examination of § 546(e), it becomes fairly clear that 
the language of the statute, taken to its outermost bounds, might seri-
ously impede the trustee’s avoidance powers in Ponzi bankruptcies. 
Now, it is true that actual fraudulent transfers under § 
548(a)(1)(A) are exempted from the protection of § 546(e).  Howev-
er, we must also remember that the reach-back period for actual 
fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(1)(A) is only two years pre-
petition.  This makes § 548(a)(1)(A) of little use in the case of a 
Ponzi scheme like Mr. Madoff’s, which spanned the better part of a 
lifetime.  Worse for the trustee, § 546(e) still reaches fraudulent 
transfer actions brought under state law pursuant to § 544, which may 
have much longer reach-back periods. 
 
177 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(38), 741(5). 
178 11 U.S.C. § 741(8). 
179 QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
180 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, 651 F.3d 329, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2011); Kai-
ser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849-50 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Ham-
ilton Taft & Co., 114 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1997). 
181 QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 545, 549. 
182 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(i). 
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These concerns have made the precise reach of § 546(e) the 
subject of much controversy in recent years.183  One controversial is-
sue, which we will explore for illustrative purposes, is whether a “set-
tlement payment” must be a public securities transaction involving a 
“clearing house,” or whether it may be a private transaction directly 
between private persons.184 
The courts holding that a “settlement payment” must involve 
publicly-traded securities read the legislative history to indicate that 
Congress’ main purpose in enacting § 546(e) was to protect, from 
avoidance, settled transactions in the public securities markets, in the 
event of “a major bankruptcy affecting those industries.”185  Public 
securities transactions involve certain national “clearing houses,” 
which not only serve as conduits, but also take title to the securities 
and independently guarantee the obligations of the buyers and 
sellers.186  If a bankruptcy trustee could avoid such transactions, this 
could subject these clearing houses to vast liability and seriously un-
dermine investor confidence in the stability of settled securities trans-
actions.  These courts feel that private securities transactions simply 
do not implicate these concerns, and therefore should not come under 
the protection of § 546(e).187 
However, the courts espousing the opposite view also have 
strong arguments. It seems that the trend among the Circuit Courts of 
Appeal is to hold that “settlement payments” do include private secu-
rities transactions.188  Nothing in the relevant statutory text or legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended to exclude private secu-
rities transactions from the definition of “settlement payment.”  
Granted, protection of the “clearing houses” was one important rea-
son for enacting § 546(e), but some would argue that this was merely 
 
183 See, e.g., SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Invest. Secs., LLC (In re Madoff Secs.), 476 B.R. 
715 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
184 Compare QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 549-550 (stating that “settlement payment” can 
involve a private securities transaction), with Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.), 367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“set-
tlement payment” must involve a public securities transaction). 
185 QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 549-50. 
186 Enron, 651 F.3d at 344 (Koeltl, J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 343-45; QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 549-50; Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 
564 F.3d 981, 985-86; Norstan Apparel Shops, 367 B.R. at 76. 
188 See, e.g., Enron, 651 F.3d at 338 (“settlement payments” need not pass through hands 
of intermediaries who take title); QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 550 (holding that “settlement 
payments” can involve transactions in privately-held securities); In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 
590 F.3d 252, at 258-59 (3rd Cir. 2009); Frost, 564 F.3d at 985-86. 
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a means to the greater end of promoting investor confidence in the 
stability of securities transactions generally.189  Indeed, prima facie 
there is arguably no reason to suppose that uprooting settled private 
securities transactions undermines investor confidence any less than 
uprooting settled public ones. Bankruptcy-induced volatility in either 
context could destroy investor confidence.190 
There are, of course, other controversial issues surrounding § 
546(e), thorough treatment of which could produce an article unto it-
self.  We hope that this brief discussion serves to illustrate the im-
portance of this provision. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Although any court may be sympathetic to the many hard-
working people who emptied their savings, and sometimes even took 
out mortgages, to invest in Ponzi schemes, hoping to see their in-
vestment grow to enable them to have a more comfortable life, the 
law does not either condone their actions or grant them immunity 
from the trustee’s right, and even duty, to claw back what they re-
ceived from such enterprises. 
In spite of the fact that Ponzi schemes are more well-known 
and exposed for what they are, it is unlikely that they will not reap-
pear in the future in some newly-invented form.  Given the nature of 
man, history will repeat itself!  The Ponzi scheme of the future will 
be reinvented and remarketed to the unwitting public.  Please be 
forewarned. 
 
 
189 Frost, 564 F.3d at 985-86; see also In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC, 458 B.R. 
87, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
190 QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 550. 
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